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Abstract Existing analyses of NPI licensing in questions instantiate two different
approaches. One approach holds that questions are NPI licensers in their own right
(Kadmon & Landman 1990; Krifka 1995, 2003; van Rooy 2003); the other holds
that, in virtue of their syntax, questions host silent expressions that do the licensing
for them, such as a silent version of exclusive only (Nicolae 2013, 2015) or negation
not (Guerzoni & Sharvit 2014). Based one a pattern of NPI licensing in alternative
questions, this paper presents a case for the former approach. Specifically, it offers
an argument for the analysis developed in Krifka 1995, 2003 and van Rooy 2003,
which centrally refers to questions’ information theoretic entropy (Shannon 1948).
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1 Introduction
Weak negative polarity items (NPIs) like unstressed existential any or ever are
known to be licensed in information seeking questions, including polar questions
and wh-questions (e.g., Krifka 1995).
(1) a. Did Ann eat anything?
b. Which of the children ate anything?
Two types of analyses have emerged. The questions-are-licensers (QAL) approach
holds that questions are NPI licensers in their own right, in the sense that the theory
of NPI licensing refers to questions (Kadmon & Landman 1990; Krifka 1995, 2003;
van Rooy 2003). The questions-introduce-licensers (QIL) approach, in contrast,
denies that the theory of NPI licensing refers to questions; it holds instead that in
virtue of their syntax, questions can host silent expressions that do the licensing for
them, such as a silent version of exclusive only (Nicolae 2013, 2015) or negation not
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Questions as licensers
(Guerzoni & Sharvit 2014), which are known to license NPIs outside the question
context as well.
Most recently, the QIL approach has been the more conspicuous in the liter-
ature (Nicolae 2013; Guerzoni & Sharvit 2014; Nicolae 2015). Here I will offer
a case for the QAL approach. Specifically, I will put forward an argument for an
analysis developed in Krifka 1995 and van Rooy 2003, which centrally employs the
information-theoretic notion of entropy (Shannon 1948; Cover & Thomas 2012).
I do so by identifying a benefit of that account that so far appears to have
gone unnoticed: it solves a puzzle regarding the licensing of weak NPIs in so-
called alternative questions, which here I will refer to as disjunctive questions.
Disjunctive questions can be classified as polar or phrasal, as illustrated in (2).1 The
generalization suggested by the contrast in (3), the puzzle I will set out to solve, is
that polar, but not phrasal, disjunctive questions license weak NPIs.2
(2) a. Did Ann eat something or not? polar
b. Did ANN eat something or BEN? phrasal
(3) a. Did Ann eat anything or not? polar
b. #Did ANN eat anything or BEN? phrasal
To preview, under the QAL analysis to be explored here, NPI licensing in
questions is dependent on syntactic form only in so far as the latter determines
semantic interpretation. Assuming that a polar disjunctive question shares the
semantics of its (non-disjunctive) polar counterpart (e.g., Guerzoni & Sharvit 2014),
it is immediately predicted that the two behave alike with regard to NPI licensing.
As for the central case of phrasal disjunctive questions, it is their presupposition
of existence and uniqueness (e.g., Biezma & Rawlins 2012) that will be seen to
interfere with NPI licensing in virtue of its effects on information theoretic question
entropy.
1 Phrasal disjunctive questions have a prosodic signature that typically includes focus prosody on the
parallel elements in the two disjuncts, such as Ann and Ben in (2b), where focus prosody is marked
by capitalization. For details, see Biezma & Rawlins 2015 and references cited there.
2 This generalization seems quite robust. In particular, there was no disagreement about (3a) or
(3b) among the four English speakers I consulted. In assuming the generalization to be valid, I
set aside Guerzoni & Sharvit’s (2014) report that polar disjunctive questions do not license weak
NPIs. (The judgment Guerzoni & Sharvit report is also in conflict with Bolinger 1978, where the
acceptability of Have you ever been there or not? is taken for granted.) I likewise set aside Nicolae’s
(2013) report that NPIs are licensed in phrasal disjunctive questions as long as they meet certain
syntactic conditions. Disagreeing with Nicolae’s portrayal of the data, and consistent with judgments
provided by my English speaker consultants, Guerzoni & Sharvit (2014) (like Ladusaw 1979 and
Higginbotham 1993) suggest that phrasal disjunctive questions fail to license NPIs across the board.
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2 A baseline theory
As a point of reference, (4) outlines a baseline theory of weak NPI licensing, broadly
aligned with Kadmon & Landman 1993, as developed in Krifka 1995, Lahiri 1998,
and Chierchia 2013.
(4) i. ∀f [ f ∈ |NPI | → f ⊂ ||NPI || ] NPI semantics
ii. ∀p [ p ∈ | . . .NPI . . . | → || . . .NPI . . . || ⊂ p ] NPI condition
The baseline theory assumes that, in addition to the actual denotation ||φ ||, grammar
assigns a linguistic expression φ a set of alternative semantic values |φ |. According
to clause (i), the NPI semantics, the actual denotation of a NPI is strictly weaker than
any of the alternatives; clause (ii), the NPI condition, requires that for some larger
syntactic domain [. . .NPI . . . ], this strength relation be reversed, with the domain’s
actual denotation being strictly stronger than each of the alternatives.
Instantiating the NPI semantics for the case of existential anything, as shown in
(5), grammar is taken to determine an alternative set whose members are quantifiers
that differ from anything’s actual denotation in that they have a narrower domain
(Kadmon & Landman 1993; Krifka 1995; Chierchia 2013).
(5) a. ||anything || = λP.λw. ∃x∈D [P(x)(w)]
b. |anything | = {λP.λw. ∃x∈D’ [P(x)(w)]: D’⊂D}
Alternatives are assumed to expand through point-wise composition (Hamblin 1973;
Rooth 1985), yielding sets of alternative properties for a verb phrase like ate anything
in (6), and alternative propositions for clauses like Ann ate anything in (7) or Ann
did not eat anything in (8).
(6) a. ||ate anything || = λy.λw. ∃x∈D [y ate x in w]
b. |ate anything | = {λy.λw. ∃x∈D’ [y ate x in w]: D’⊂D}
(7) a. ||Ann ate anything || = λw. ∃x∈D [Ann ate x in w]
b. |Ann ate anything | = {λw. ∃x∈D’ [Ann ate x in w]: D’⊂D}
(8) a. ||not [Ann ate anything] || = λw. ¬∃x∈D [Ann ate x in w]
b. |not [Ann ate anything] | = {λw. ¬∃x∈D’ [Ann ate x in w]: D’⊂D}
As intended (Ladusaw 1979), it follows that the NPI condition in (4) is not met
unless anything is interpreted in the scope of an entailment reversing operator, such
as negation not. So, (9a) is false but (9b) is true, capturing the basic contrast between
(10a) and (10b).
(9) a. ∀p [p∈|Ann ate anything | → ||Ann ate anything ||⊂p]
b. ∀p [p∈|not [Ann eat anything] | → ||not [Ann ate anything] ||⊂p]
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(10) a. *Ann ate anything.
b. Ann didn’t eat anything.
Before moving on, let me point out that, as long as the domain D, and hence the
alternative set for anything in (5b), is non-empty, it includes the impossible quan-
tifier, the quantifier that maps any input property to the contradictory proposition.
Given that the quantificational force of anything is existential, this is guaranteed
by that fact that any non-empty domain D has the empty set as a proper subset.
Accordingly, if non-empty, the alternative set for ate anything in (6b), will include
the impossible property, the property of individuals that maps any input individual to
the contradictory proposition; and the alternative sets in (7b) and (8b) will include
the contradictory and tautological proposition, respectively. The existence of such
trivial alternatives will become relevant in section 5.
3 Questions as licensers
The QAL approach extends a baseline theory like (4) so as to render it applicable
in cases where the relevant syntactic domain [. . .NPI . . . ] referred to in the NPI
condition is a question. The baseline theory requires an extension because the (strict)
entailment relation ⊂ that (4) appeals to is not applicable to questions in the first
place. Kadmon & Landman (1990), Krifka (1995, 2003), and van Rooy (2003)
accordingly search for a suitable ordering relation > that applies to questions in
the right way, to be substituted for the strict entailment relation ⊂. With such an
ordering relation > given, an NPI theory for questions takes the form in (11).
(11) i. ∀f [f ∈ |NPI | → f ⊂ ||NPI ||] NPI semantics
ii. ∀Q’[Q’ ∈ | . . .NPI . . . ? | → || . . .NPI . . . ? || > Q’] NPI condition
This leaves open the crucial question of how the ordering > is to be defined.
Naturally, the answer is dependent on assumptions about the semantics of questions,
which is the topic of the next subsection.
3.1 Question meanings and alternatives
The QAL analysis being laid out here rests on the uncontroversial assumption
that the semantics of a polar question determines a set of two propositions, viz. the
proposition denoted by the question’s prejacent and its negation. The polar question’s
denotation can be equated with that same set. Point-wise composition accordingly
delivers an alternative set comprised of two-membered sets of propositions. For
example, in (12), which repeats (1a), the prejacent is Ann eat anything, and so, with
the abbreviation in (13), the denotation of (12) and its alternative set are as shown in
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(14a) and (14b), respectively.
(12) Did Ann eat anything?
(13) ||Ann eat anything || = a
(14) a. ||did Ann eat anything? || = {a, –a}
b. |did Ann eat anything? | = {{a’, –a’}: a’ ∈ |Ann eat anything |}
A wh-question denotation, too, can be taken to denote a set of propositions.
Under a strongly exhaustive question meaning in the sense of Groenendijk & Stokhof
1984, the members of a wh-question denotation (like the two members of a polar
question denotation) partition the logical space. The members of this partition can be
defined in terms of the wh-question’s Hamblin answers. The Hamblin answers are
the propositions obtained by applying the property given by the wh-phrase’s scope
to the elements in the extension of the wh-phrase’s restrictor. In the wh-questions of
interest here, the elements of the question partition can then be formed by conjoining
those Hamblin answers or their negations. For example, in (15), which repeats
(1b), the wh-phrase’s restrictor is (of the) children, and its scope is ate anything.
Assuming for purposes of illustration that the restrictor’s extension is a set of just
two individuals, the children a and b, and employing the abbreviation in (16), (15)
has the Hamblin answers A(a) and A(b). The denotation of (15) is then the partition
in (17a) and its alternative set is the set of partitions in (17b).
(15) Which of the children ate anything?
(16) ||ate anything || = A
(17) a. ||which of the children [ate anything]? || =
{A(a)∩A(b), –A(a)∩A(b), A(a)∩–A(b), –A(a)∩–A(b)}
b. |which of the children [ate anything]? | =
{ {A’(a)∩A’(b), –A’(a)∩A’(b), A’(a)∩–A’(b), –A’(a)∩–A’(b)}:
A’ ∈ |ate anything | }
Under the proposed semantics for polar and wh-questions, then, questions of
both types denote sets of propositions that partition the logical space. As detailed
below, van Rooy (2003) employs such a question semantics to define an ordering on
question meanings intended to feed the theory of NPI licensing.
3.2 Ordering questions
Building on Krifka 1995, van Rooy 2003 proposes an ordering relation between
questions in terms of questions’ information theoretic entropy (Shannon 1948; Cover
& Thomas 2012). As stated in (18), for any question partitions Q and Q’, Q is taken
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to be ordered above Q’ just in case Q has greater entropy than Q’, where the entropy
of any partition Q is defined as in (19).
(18) Q > Q’ :⇔ EntPrs(Q) > EntPrs(Q’)
(19) EntPr(Q) := ∑
q∈Q
Pr(q) × log2( 1Pr(q) )
In (19), the entropy of a set of propositions Q is defined relative to a probability
mass function Pr with domain Q, that is, a function that maps each member of Q to
a probability such that the probabilities in the range of Pr sum up to 1.3 In (18), the
subscript s in Prs indicates that the ordering of questions is intended to be relative
to a probability mass function determined by the speaker’s information state. The
entropy of a question partition Q relative to any given probability mass function Pr
is a measure of how evenly Pr distributes the probability mass over the propositions
in Q. Accordingly, the entropy of Q relative to Prs is a measure of the speaker’s
uncertainty about which member of Q is true.
To illustrate, consider the question partitions Q1 and Q2 defined in (20). Table 1
specifies the entropy of these questions relative to a few selected probabilities mass
functions.
(20) a. Q1 = {p, –p}
b. Q2 = {p∩q, –p∩q, p∩–q, –p∩–q}
Table 1 illustrates that the entropy of a question is 0 if all the probability mass is
in one of the cells of the partition (first and fifth row), and that it is maximal if all
the cells of the partition have equal probability (third row). For a probability mass
function determined by the speaker’s information state, the former case amounts to
the speaker’s information state entailing a complete answer to the question, while
the latter case amounts to the speaker being maximally uncertainty or unbiased as
to the question’s true answer. Probability mass functions that are between those
two extremes determine entropy values that fall between 0 and the maximal entropy
value (second and fourth row).
We will in the following be interested in how the entropy of a polar question
denotation depends on the probability of the positive answer (p in Q1), and how the
entropy of a wh-question denotation depends on the probabilities of the Hamblin
answers (p and q in Q2). For Q1 and Q2, these dependencies are plotted in Figure 1,
where the right-hand curve assumes for Q2 that the Hamblin answers p and q are
independent and have equal probability.
3 Note that this latter condition is necessarily met if Q partitions the logical space, as in the question
meanings seen so far. However, we will later focus on cases where this condition is proposed to have
a non-trivial effect, viz. cases of NPIs in phrasal disjunctive questions.
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Pr(p) Pr(–p) EntPr(Q1)
0 1 0
1
4
3
4 0.81
1
2
1
2 1
3
4
1
4 0.81
1 0 0
Pr(p∩q) Pr(–p∩q) Pr(p∩–q) Pr(–p∩–q) EntPr(Q2)
0 0 0 1 0
1
16
3
16
3
16
9
16 1.62
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4 2
9
16
3
16
3
16
1
16 1.62
1 0 0 0 0
Table 1
Figure 1
With an ordering of question denotations defined, we can now turn to applying
this ordering in the analysis of weak NPIs in questions.
3.3 Questions as licensers
In (21), the rendition of the NPI theory for questions in (11) is updated by spelling
out the ordering between questions appealed to in the NPI condition in (ii), in
accordance with the definition in (18).
(21) i. ∀f [f ∈ |NPI | → f ⊂ ||NPI ||] NPI semantics
ii. ∀Q’[Q’ ∈ | . . .NPI . . . ? | →
EntPrs(|| . . .NPI . . . ? ||) > EntPrs(Q’)] NPI condition
An essential and obvious desideratum is that the NPI condition be satisfiable
for basic cases like the polar question in (12) and the wh-question in (15), repeated
again in (22).
(22) a. Did Ann eat anything?
b. Which of the children ate anything?
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This requirement is indeed met. For (22a), note first that the question semantics
in (14) above guarantees (23a), that is, any alternative a’ to the actual positive answer
a is strictly stronger than a itself. Given this, probability theory guarantees (23b),
that is, no alternative positive answer a’ is more probable than the actual positive
answer a.
(23) a. ∀ a’[a’ ∈ |Ann eat anything | → a’⊂ a]
b. ∀ a’[a’ ∈ |Ann eat anything | → Pr(a) ≥Pr(a’) ]
Now suppose that Prs(a), the probability of a given by the speaker’s information
state, is 12 or less. Given (23), it can then be read off the left-hand curve in Figure 1
that the entropy of any alternative question is no greater than the entropy of the actual
question; so, as long the probability of any alternative positive answer is different
from the probability of the actual positive answer, the entropy of any alternative
question will be strictly less than the entropy of the actual question. This entails that
the NPI condition in (21) is satisfiable for polar questions, capturing the acceptability
of examples like (22a).
With suitable adjustments, this assessment carries over to wh-questions like
(22b). Suppose again that the wh-restrictor’s extension is comprised of the two
children a and b, and hence that the question semantics is as in (17) above. This
semantics guarantees the truth of (24a), that is, any two alternative Hamblin answers
A’(a) and A’(b) are strictly stronger than the actual Hamblin answers A(a) and A(b),
respectively. Probability theory in turn guarantees the truth of (24b), that is, the
probabilities of any two alternative Hamblin answers A’(a) and A’(b) are no greater
than those of the actual Hamblin answers A(a) and A(b), respectively.
(24) a. ∀ A’[A’ ∈ |ate anything | → A’(a) ⊂ A(a) & A’(b) ⊂ A(b)]
b. ∀ A’[A’ ∈ |ate anything | →
Pr(A(a)) ≥Pr(A’(a)) & Pr(A(b)) ≥Pr(A’(b)) ]
Suppose now that Prs(A(a)) and Prs(A(b)) are equal and are both 12 or less but
not 0. Given (24), since the two Hamblin answers A(a) and A(b) are independent, we
can then read off the right-hand curve in Figure 1 that any alternative question will
have no greater entropy than the actual question; so, as long as the probabilities of
any alternative Hamblin answers A’(a) and A’(b) are different from the probabilities
of A(a) and A(b), respectively, the entropy of any alternative question will be strictly
less than the entropy of the actual question. Hence, for the case of wh-questions too,
the NPI condition in (21) is satisfiable, capturing the acceptability of examples like
(22b).
With a rendition of van Rooy’s (2003) entropy-based QAL analysis in place,
we now are at last ready to return to the puzzle of NPIs in disjunctive questions
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introduced in section 1.
4 The disjunctive question puzzle solved
To recap, the puzzle to be solved is the generalization that polar but not phrasal
disjunctive questions license NPIs. This generalization is illustrated by the contrast
in (3), which is repeated here as (25).
(25) a. Did Ann eat anything or not? polar
b. #Did ANN eat anything or BEN? phrasal
We will see that under the QAL analysis introduced above, the contrast falls out
under independently motivated assumptions about the semantics of polar and phrasal
disjunctive questions.
4.1 Polar disjunctive questions
Applying the NPI theory to polar disjunctive questions requires one to take a stand
on the semantics of those questions. One natural hypothesis is that polar disjunctive
questions have the same semantics as (non-disjunctive) polar questions. This view
is natural enough to have been widely adopted in the literature, including, for
example, Karttunen 1977, van Rooy & Safarova 2003, and Guerzoni & Sharvit 2014.
Its benefits include the prediction that the two types of questions make identical
contributions to truth conditions in cases where they appear embedded under a
predicate like know, a prediction whose correctness is illustrated by the perceived
truth conditional equivalence of (26a) and (26b).4
(26) a. Ben knows [whether Ann ate something].
b. Ben knows [whether Ann ate something or not].
I will therefore adopt the view that disjunctive and non-disjunctive polar ques-
tions have the same semantics, and so I consider the two questions in (27), which
once again reprints (3a) and (22a), to be semantically equivalent. Under current
assumptions, then, (27a) has the denotation and alternative set given in (28).
4 Bolinger (1978) observed that polar questions and their polar disjunctive counterparts are not always
interchangeable. For example, Bolinger reports that polar questions, but not polar disjunctive
questions, can be used to extend an invitation. There is disagreement in the literature about what such
contrasts entail about the semantic relation between the two types of questions. Biezma & Rawlins
(2012) propose different denotations for polar questions and their polar disjunctive counterparts. In
contrast, van Rooy & Safarova (2003) maintain that the two types of questions are semantically alike
and that their differences can be understood in terms of pragmatics alone. The arguments made in
this paper lead me to side with van Rooy & Safarova.
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(27) a. Did Ann eat anything or not?
b. Did Ann eat anything?
(28) a. ||did Ann eat anything or not? || = {a, –a}
b. |did Ann eat anything or not? | = {{a’, –a’}: a’∈|Ann eat anything |}
The QAL analysis of NPI licensing in questions outlined above then immediately
predicts NPI licensing in polar alternative questions like (27a). After all, the theory
only makes reference to a question’s semantics, not to the syntactic structure that
gives rise to this semantics. The analysis does not see the syntactic differences
between disjunctive and non-disjunctive polar questions, predicting that the two
behave alike in terms of NPI licensing. Therefore, since we have seen that the
analysis correctly allows for NPI licensing by polar disjunctive questions, the same is
guaranteed to hold for polar disjunctive questions. The first part of the generalization
about NPIs in disjunctive questions has found a straightforward account.
4.2 Phrasal disjunctive questions
The second part of the generalization to be explained here is that, in contrast to polar
disjunctive questions, NPIs are not licensed in phrasal disjunctive questions. To
understand what might interfere with NPI licensing in phrasal disjunctive questions,
it will be useful to compare them with wh-questions. What is the source of the
contrast in (29) (which once again repeats (1b) and (3b))?
(29) a. #Did ANN eat anything or BEN?
b. Which of the children ate anything?
In an analysis that may suggest itself (e.g., Karttunen 1977; Krifka 2011), the
disjoined propositions given by a phrasal disjunctive question, such as A(a) and
A(b) in (29a), enter the denotation of such a question in the same way as Hamblin
answers enter the denotation of a wh-question. Under present assumptions, this
analysis leads to the semantics for (29a) given in (30).
(30) a. ||did ANN eat anything or BEN? || =
{A(a)∩A(b), –A(a)∩A(b), A(a)∩–A(b), –A(a)∩–A(b)}
b. |did ANN eat anything or BEN? | =
{ {A’(a)∩A’(b), –A’(a)∩A’(b), A’(a)∩–A’(b), –A’(a)∩–A’(b)}:
A’ ∈ |eat anything | }
Of course, this is the very semantics assigned above, in (17), to the wh-question
(29b) under the assumption that the children are a and b. As noted, however, the
QAL analysis introduced in section 3 predicts that semantically equivalent questions
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behave alike with regard to NPI licensing. Since, as seen, wh-questions are predicted
to license NPIs, the same would have to be true for phrasal disjunctive questions. As
matters stand, then, the second part of the generalization presents a challenge to this
QAL analysis, rather the argument in its support advertised at the outset.
However, there are well-known observations about phrasal disjunctive questions
that, independently from NPI licensing data, motivate a revision of the semantics in
(30). Below I turn to these observations and the revisions they motivate.
4.2.1 Presupposition of existence and uniqueness
Phrasal disjunctive questions have been observed to carry an existence and unique-
ness presupposition, the presupposition that exactly one of the two disjoined propo-
sitions is true (e.g. Karttunen & Peters 1976; Bartels 1999; Biezma & Rawlins
2012). As Biezma & Rawlins (2012) observe, this presupposition can be detected,
for example, by considering potential partial answers to a phrasal disjunctive ques-
tion that merely state one of the hypothesized presuppositions. In (31), the intuited
infelicity of the answers B and C can be taken to indicate that B and C do not provide
even a partial answer to A, as they are already entailed by what A presupposes – the
existence presupposition in B, and the uniqueness presupposition in C.
(31) A: Did ANN eat something or BEN?
B: #At least one of the two did.
C: #At most one of the two did.
The existence and uniqueness presuppositions can be encoded in the denotation
of a phrasal disjunctive question by expunging from it those answers that are in-
compatible with those presuppositions. The semantic assumptions in (30) are then
replaced with those in (32), where the propositions A(a)∩A(b) and –A(a)∩–A(b)
are omitted from the question denotation, and likewise for the corresponding propo-
sitions in the alternative set.5
(32) a. ||did ANN eat anything or BEN? || =
{–A(a)∩A(b), A(a)∩–A(b)}
b. |did ANN eat anything or BEN? | =
{ {–A’(a)∩A’(b), A’(a)∩–A’(b)}: A’ ∈ |ate anything |}
The existence plus uniqueness presupposition has thereby been encoded in the
5 This analysis effectively applies to phrasal disjunctive questions Higginbotham’s (1993) proposal
about how to semantically encode the presupposition of existence and uniqueness carried by singular
which-questions. See Schwarz 2017 for NPI licensing in singular which-questions, which space
reasons prevent me from discussing here.
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question meaning, as it amounts to the disjunction of the remaining propositions in
the question denotation, i.e., –A(a)∩A(b) ∪ A(a)∩–A(b).
Given this question semantics, what does the QAL analysis under consideration
predict about NPI licensing? We will see below that this semantics renders the NPI
condition impossible to satisfy, correctly capturing the generalization that NPIs are
not licensed by phrasal disjunctive questions.
4.2.2 The NPI condition cannot be met
The following establishes that, given the NPI semantics in (21), reprinted in (33)
below, and the presupposition posited for phrasal disjunctive questions, and assuming
that the domain D is non-empty, the NPI condition as applied to such questions is
impossible to meet: in these cases, it is impossible for the entropy of the actual
question to differ from the entropies of all (in fact, any) of the alternatives.
(33) i. ∀f [f ∈ |NPI | → f ⊂ ||NPI ||] NPI semantics
ii. ∀Q’[Q’ ∈ | . . .NPI . . . ? | →
EntPrs(|| . . .NPI . . . ? ||) > EntPrs(Q’)] NPI condition
To begin, by entailing that no alternative question has the same entropy as the
actual question, the NPI condition entails that there is no alternative question whose
Hamblin answers have the same probabilities as the corresponding actual Hamblin
answers:
[1] ¬∃A’[A’∈|eat anything | & Prs(A(a)) = Prs(A’(a)) &
Prs(A(b)) = Prs(A’(b)) ]
However, as shown below, given the existence and uniqueness presupposition, and
given the NPI semantics, the NPI condition also implies the negation of [1].
As noted earlier, for the entropy of a set of propositions to be defined relative
to a probability mass function, the probabilities assigned to the members of that set
must sum to 1. So the NPI condition imposes the requirement that for the actual
question, the answers’ probabilities given by the speaker’s epistemic state sum to 1.
Given that the domain D, and hence the alternative set for ate anything, is non-empty
by assumption, the same requirement holds for some of the alternative questions (in
fact, it holds for all alternatives):
[2] a. Prs(–A(a)∩A(b)) + Prs(A(a)∩–A(b)) = 1
b. ∃A’[A’∈|eat anything | & Prs(–A’(a)∩A’(b)) +
Prs(A’(a)∩–A’(b)) = 1]
Probability theory then ensures that the probabilities of the Hamblin answers to
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the actual question must sum to 1, and likewise for the probabilities of the Hamblin
answers to some (in fact, all) of the alternative questions:6
[3] a. Prs(A(a)) + Prs(A(b)) = 1
b. ∃A’[A’∈|eat anything | & Prs(A’(a)) + Prs(A’(b)) = 1]
However, we have already observed (as stated in (24) above) that, due to the
NPI semantics, a Hamblin answer to any of the alternative questions cannot be more
probable than the corresponding Hamblin answer to the actual question:
[4] ∀A’[A’∈|eat anything | → Prs(A(a)) ≥Prs(A’(a)) &
Prs(A(b)) ≥Prs(A’(b)) ]
And so, since the probabilities of the Hamblin answers must sum to 1 in the actual
question (as per [3a]) and some alternative (as per [3b]), it follows that the Hamblin
answers in that alternative must have the same probabilities as the corresponding
actual Hamblin answers:
[5] ∃A’[A’∈|eat anything | & Prs(A(a)) = Prs(A’(a)) &
Prs(A(b)) = Prs(A’(b)) ]
Which entails that there is some alternative question that has the same entropy as the
actual question, contradicting the requirement, stated in [1], that there be no such
alternative.
In sum, for phrasal disjunctive questions, the NPI condition is not satisfiable,
and the finding that such questions do not license NPIs has be given a principled
account.
5 A complication: mere existence presuppositions
However, this account requires a refinement. For reasons detailed below, the NPI
condition turns out to be too strong to do justice to the full range of data.
The NPI licensing contrast between the polar disjunctive question in (29a) and
the wh-question (29b), repeated below as (34), has here been credited to the presup-
position of existence and uniqueness attested in the former. However, according to a
prevalent intuition, wh-questions, too, carry a presupposition, viz. a presupposition
of existence (e.g., Karttunen 1977). For (29b), this is the presupposition that at least
one of the children ate something.
(34) Which of the children ate anything?
6 Sketch of proof: let Pr(−p∩q)+Pr(p∩−q) = 1; this guarantees Pr(p∩q) = 0, hence both Pr(−p∩
q)+Pr(p∩−q) = Pr(p∪q) and Pr(p)+Pr(q) = Pr(p∪q), and therefore Pr(p)+Pr(q) = 1.
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Pr(p∩q) Pr(–p∩q) Pr(p∩–q) EntPr(Q3)
0 12
1
2 1
1
3
1
3
1
3 1.59
1 0 0 0
Table 2
In analogy to the above treatment of phrasal disjunctive questions, the existence
presupposition of a wh-question is to be entered in the question denotation by
expunging from it the proposition that is inconsistent with the presupposition, and
likewise for the alternative sets of propositions. Again supposing for illustration that
the wh-restrictor extension is comprised of the two children a and b, this amounts to
replacing (17) above with (35) below.
(35) a. ||which of the children ate anything? || =
{–A(a)∩A(b), A(a)∩–A(b), A(a)∩A(b)}
b. |which of the children ate anything? | =
{ {–A’(a)∩A’(b), A’(a)∩–A’(b), A’(a)∩A’(b)}: A’ ∈ |ate anything |}
Under this revised semantics, the question denotation again encodes an existence
presupposition as the disjunction of the propositions it contains, which is now
equivalent to A(a)∪A(b).
How does the NPI condition in (33) apply to (29a) under the revised semantics
in (35)? To address this question, consider the information given in Table 2 and
Figure 2 about the set of propositions Q3 defined in (36) below. Table 2 shows the
entropy of Q3 for selected probability mass functions with domain Q3. This table
provides background for Figure 2, which, assuming that Pr(p) equals Pr(q), shows
how the probability of p and q determines the entropy of Q3.
(36) Q3 = {–p∩q, p∩–q, p∩q}
What stands out about Figure 2 is the limitation of the x-axis to the interval
from 12 to 1. The reason for this limitation is that, assuming Pr(p) equals Pr(q),
probability theory requires that any probability mass function from Q3 map p and q
to a probability of no less than 12 . So, relative to any probability function that maps p
and q to a probability of less than 12 , the entropy of Q3 fails to be defined. Dropping
the assumption that Pr(p) equals Pr(q), it holds more generally that any probability
mass function from Q3 maps p and q to probabilities that sum to at least 1, and hence
that the entropy of Q3 is undefined relative to any probability function that does not
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Figure 2
meet this constraint.7 More generally still, probability theory can be shown to ensure
that a question denotation that encodes an existence presupposition, whatever the
number of Hamblin answers it might be based on, will not have a defined entropy
unless the probabilities of those Hamblin answers sum to at least 1.
To appreciate the significance of this fact for (34) under the semantics in (35),
recall from section 2 the observation that the alternative set for ate anything, if
non-empty, includes among its members the impossible property, the property that
maps any individual in its domain to the contradictory proposition. For this choice
of A’, then, all the Hamblin answers become equivalent by collapsing into the
contradictory proposition. To be sure, that alternative Hamblin answer will not be
mapped to 1 by the function Prs, the probability function determined by the speaker’s
information state. Which ensures that for the wh-question (34) under the semantics
(35), there exists an alternative question whose entropy is undefined. As matters
stand, therefore, even for the acceptable wh-question (34), the NPI condition as
stated in (33) turns out to not be satisfiable.
This suggests that the NPI condition for questions in (21) above is too strong.
The condition should not be construed a requiring that every alternative to the actual
question have an entropy that is lower than the entropy of the actual question. To
capture all the relevant data, the condition should instead require (i) that there be
an alternative question whose entropy is defined and (ii) that for each alternative
question whose entropy is defined, it is less than the entropy of the actual question.
With this revision, the rendition of the NPI theory for questions in (21) above is to
be replaced with (37) below.
7 Sketch of proof: the assumption Pr(−p∩q)+Pr(p∩−q)+Pr(p∩q) = 1 guarantees Pr(p∪q) = 1;
given that Pr(p∪ q) ≤ Pr(p) + Pr(q) (an instance of the so-called union bound) it follows that
Pr(p)+Pr(q)≥ 1.
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(37) i. ∀f [f ∈ |NPI | → f ⊂ ||NPI ||] NPI semantics
ii. ∃Q’[Q’ ∈ | . . .NPI . . . ? | & EntPrs(Q’) is defined] &
∀Q’[Q’ ∈ | . . .NPI . . . ? | & EntPrs(Q’) is defined→
EntPrs(|| . . .NPI . . . ? ||) > EntPrs(Q’)] NPI condition
As intended, the revised definition renders the NPI condition satisfiable for the
question in (34) under the semantics in (35): as can be read off Figure 2, the NPI
condition in (37) can be satisfied, in particular, if Prs(A(a)) and Prs(A(a)) are equal
and are both 23 or less but greater than
1
2 ; in that case, for reasons familiar from the
exposition in section 3, the entropy of any alternative question, if defined, cannot
be greater than the entropy of the actual question, and will be strictly less than the
actual question’s entropy as long as the corresponding alternative Hamblin answers
are assigned different probabilities than the actual Hamblin answers.
At the same time, under this revised NPI theory for questions, the existence plus
uniqueness presupposition assumed for phrasal disjunctive questions continues to
prevent the NPI condition from being satisfied. As can be read off the the proof
presented in 4.2.2, a presupposition of existence and uniqueness forces the entropy
of any alternative question, if defined, to be identical to the entropy of the actual
question. The revision of the NPI condition proposed here therefore preserves the
main result of this paper. Phrasal disjunctive question are still predicted to not license
NPIs, on the grounds of that in such cases the NPI condition is not satisfiable.
6 Conclusion
The questions-are-licensers analysis based on question entropy (Krifka 1995; van
Rooy 2003) offers a theoretically parsimonious solution to the puzzle of NPIs
in disjunctive questions. In particular, it makes the welcome prediction that the
existence plus uniqueness presupposition that is independently attested in phrasal
disjunctive questions makes the licensing conditions for an NPI impossible to satisfy.
The questions-introduce-licensers analyses of Nicolae (2013, 2015) and Guerzoni
& Sharvit (2014) make different predictions, predictions that are in conflict with
the generalization about disjunctive questions assumed in this paper. These authors
considered those different predictions to be correct. However, to the extent that the
generalization assumed here is accepted (see footnote 2), the findings in this paper
constitute an argument for the questions-are-licensers account explored here over
the competing questions-introduce-licensers analyses.
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